Synopsis of The Discursive Foundations of Meaning

Why do words and sentences have the particular meanings they do? Indeed, how do mere sounds and squiggles (like the ones you are reading right now) come to possess any semantic properties at all? These are the questions of metasemantics. One approach to answering the metasemantic questions begins with the thought that an expression’s meaning is determined by how it is used. However, as Wittgenstein emphasized, language can be used in all sorts of different ways and for all sorts of different purposes: to describe the world, to ask questions, to tell jokes, to issue commands, and so on. If there is any hope of developing a systematic use-based metasemantics, a necessary first step is thus to privilege some aspects of use over others.

Some philosophers have proposed to focus on inferential aspects of use. The expressions of a language are interrelated in a vast network of inferential links. From “lizard” we infer “reptile”; from “tall” we infer “not short”. According to inferentialists, the meaning of any particular expression is determined somehow by its role in this kind of broader inferential web. In my dissertation, I develop a metasemantic theory that is inferentialist in spirit, although it differs significantly from previous elaborations of the idea. Ultimately, I argue that my account solves the major problems that have beset traditional inferentialist theories, and indeed previous metasemantic theories more generally. 

One of the unusual features of my approach is that it is non-psychological. Philosophical orthodoxy has it that linguistic meaning is derivative from mental content: first, there are beliefs and intentions; then linguistic symbols get imbued with meaning by association with these prior mental representations. This psychological approach is reflected in traditional inferentialist theories through their preoccupation with inferring, conceived as a mental transition between belief states. By contrast, I aim to elucidate the basis of linguistic meaning directly, without a diversion through mental content. Accordingly, my version of metasemantic inferentialism involves looking to inferential aspects of interpersonal discursive practice, rather than inferential aspects of cognition.

In chapter 1, I focus on assertion and argumentation. Drawing some inspiration from the work of Robert Brandom, I propose that both activities revolve around the dynamics of discursive commitments. When a speaker asserts a sentence, they commit to accepting that sentence within the bounds of the discourse at hand. When a speaker argues for a claim, they exploit the ways these discursive commitments propagate inferentially. For example, if I argue from ‘p’ to ‘q’, I rely on the possibility of my audience becoming committed to accepting ‘q’ on the basis of a prior commitment to ‘p’.

In Chapters 2 and 3, I develop the commitment-centric perspective on discourse further, focusing on the way discursive participants attribute commitments to themselves and their interlocutors in the course of conversation. This can be thought of as a practice of “scorekeeping”. A scorekeeper keeps a tally of each speaker’s commitments, and this tally is continuously updated — both in response to conversational performances and through the application of inferential rules that dictate how existing commitments generate new ones. A central idea developed here is that cooperative interlocutors tend to coordinate which inferential rules they use to keep score. This is a way for interlocutors to stay on the same page about the current state of conversation, as well as the rules for arbitrating disputes within the discourse.

Chapter 4 marks the transition from the domain of mere use to the domain of meaning. Here, the concept of disagreement plays an important bridging role. On the one hand, disagreement is connected with synonymy: when one speaker asserts a sentence and their interlocutor denies it, whether the speakers thereby genuinely disagree depends on whether they use the disputed sentence with the same meaning. On the other hand, disagreement is fundamentally a discursive phenomenon, one that I argue can be understood in terms of the scorekeeping model of discourse developed in previous chapters. The basic idea is that for speakers to genuinely disagree, they must be able to coordinate on a shared set of inferential rules for arbitrating their dispute. If that kind of meta-dialectical coordination proves impossible, then the disputants are merely speaking past each other. Because of the link between disagreement and synonymy, elucidating the conditions under which genuine disagreement occurs goes hand in hand with elucidating the conditions under which speakers use sentences synonymously. 

Chapter 5 extends the account of synonymy into an account of meaning. I start by considering the “sententialist” proposal to analyze meaning ascriptions like 

(M) U means that p

as shorthand for synonymy claims like

(S) U is synonymous with ‘p’ (as I’m currently using it)

I argue against this analysis, but defend a related view that preserves its advantages. Meaning ascriptions like (M) should be taken at face value, as referring to extra-linguistic propositions rather than sentences. However, propositions, in turn, can be understood as abstractions from sentences, induced by the synonymy relation. The result is that (M) turns out to be logically equivalent to (S), even though not strictly semantically equivalent.

Finally, in chapter 6, I consider various criteria commonly used to evaluate metasemantic theories. An adequate metasemantics should avoid the pitfalls of meaning holism, eschew reliance on a dubious analytic/synthetic distinction, account for the normativity of meaning, uphold the insights of semantic externalism, and explain why meanings are compositional. I argue that the theory developed over the course of the dissertation naturally meets all these criteria and more. It therefore offers a significant advance over previous attempts to explain the foundations of meaning.